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US Landpower in Regional Focus

Strategic Landpower and the Arabian Gulf
W. Andrew Terrill
Abstract: In recent years, a variety of threats have become more
ominous for Gulf nations, and these countries have sought to
strengthen ties to the United States in ways that do not appear
to compromise their sovereignty. The US Army has responded
through a robust series of military exercises and through the development of regionally aligned forces. Consequently, the Army has
played a vital role in meeting a variety of training challenges including preparation for conventional war, counterinsurgency, and missile defense. It has also asserted an important landpower presence in
ways that reassure local allies and deter potential regional aggressors.

T

he Middle Eastern strategic environment has been especially
dynamic in the last decade due to factors such as the 2003-11
US combat operations in Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and the continuing rise in sectarian tensions and violence throughout a number of
regional countries. In the midst of these developments, the stability of
the region remains of central importance to the United States according
to numerous presidents who have enumerated the American interests in
the region.1 Most recently, President Barack Obama stated that US “core
interests” in the Middle East include: (1) safeguarding energy supplies
exported to the world, (2) counterterrorism, (3) countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and (4)
the defense of Israel and advancement of the Arab-Israeli peace process.2
Other US leaders have elaborated on the president’s views by noting the
Middle East will remain vital to the United States even if Washington
moves closer to energy independence.3 In this regard, America garners
tremendous global influence by using its military forces to guarantee
freedom of navigation for the transportation of Persian/Arabian Gulf
energy supplies.4 If the United States relinquished this position, other
powers, such as China, could become interested in this role and the global
clout it provides.
The next decade will be a particularly important era for defining
how Washington can best protect its interests in the Middle East and
especially the Gulf region. The legacy of the Iraq war will contribute
1     For an overview of past Presidential priorities and policies toward the Middle East see
Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East from the Cold War to the War on
Terror (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).
2     Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East
and North Africa,” May 19, 2011, http: www.whitehouse.gov. In this speech, President Obama also
spoke about the advancement of democracy and human rights but did not explicitly name them as
core interests.
3     Lalit K. Jha, “Gulf Region Remains Important for US Interest: Dempsey,” Press Trust of
India, March 19, 2013.
4     On the importance of Gulf oil exports for the world economy and the requirement for
military forces, see Kenneth Katzman et al., Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz (Washington DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2012) 13-15; David Crist, The Twilight War: America’s Thirty-Year
Conflict with Iran (New York: Penguin Press, 2012) 569-570; Mohammed El-Katiri, The Future of the
Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties (Carlisle, PA; Strategic Studies Institute, June 2013),
28-30.
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to this debate since that conflict generated significant US public and
policymaker concerns about the future use of military force to fight
major ground wars and then engage in long occupations, nationbuilding efforts, and counterinsurgencies. Former Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates represented this view in a particularly straightforward
way when he stated, “In my opinion, any future defense secretary who
advises the President to again send a big American land army into Asia
or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined, as
General MacArthur so delicately put it.”5 President Obama underscored
Gates’s comment by indicating that he will seek to avoid using massive
conventional military force except in cases involving US national survival interest.6 This reluctance reflects the current political values of
American society and is motivated by the administration’s concern about
developing open-ended military commitments to support secondary or
peripheral interests in ways “that we can no longer afford.” 7 Additionally,
according to a variety of polls, the general public is extremely wary of
getting involved in new Middle Eastern wars in places such as Syria and
Iran.8 Likewise, Arab public opinion remains deeply concerned about
future American military action in the region, although US favorability
ratings improved beginning in 2011 as the United States implemented
its withdrawal from Iraq.9
Nevertheless, understanding the dangers of military interventions does not allow one to reach the conclusion that conventional
war and counterinsurgency actions will never again be required. Some
challenges to US interests may not be viewed as immediate threats to
national survival, but the long-term consequences such challenges could
affect both US global leadership and economic future. If vital American
interests are strongly threatened, large segments of the American public
may consider future military actions as “wars of necessity.” Some interventions may still be required regardless of how conscientiously the
United States leadership struggles to avoid them. Moreover, American
and allied public opinion may change rapidly in such instances provided
these publics view specific future conflicts as wars of necessity.
Preparing for future wars remains vital, but doing so through actions
which deter such conflicts is an especially optimal outcome. Shaping
the Gulf strategic environment through carefully tailored collaboration
with Arab partner nations (including non-Gulf Arab allies) presents one
of the best ways to prepare for a potential conflict and deter that conflict
through United States and allied defense preparedness. In this environment, it is important that Washington has an array of forces to support
and reassure local allies and deter aggression so war can be averted.
American interests will need to be protected in a number of ways,
and the Gulf will be particularly important US strategy. Many Gulf
Arab states have critical natural resources, a great deal of infrastructure
5     Greg Jaffe, “In one of final addresses to Army, Gates describes vision for military’s future,”
The Washington Post, February 25, 2011.
6     David Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and the Surprising Use of American Power
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2012). 421.
7     Ibid.
8     Megan Thee Brenan, “Poll Shows Isolationist Streak in Americans,” The New York Times,
May 1, 2013.
9     Shibley Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the
Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 111.
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wealth, and are concerned about their limited capacity for self-defense.
Gulf leaders also consider their countries vulnerable to military pressure
or attacks by larger neighbors as well as insurgencies along the lines of
recent problems in Yemen and Iraq.10 To deal with either type of contingency, friendly states need allied support. Such support should have a
landpower dimension while seeking to avoid a large troop presence that
may cause resentment.11 Such strategies will need to be strengthened and
refined to continue serving the interests identified by President Obama
and his predecessors.

Gulf Arab Threat Perceptions

Many US Arab allies in the Gulf believe they have solid reasons to
be concerned about their future national security. The potential rise of
Iran as a nuclear weapons state is particularly worrisome to a number of
Gulf Arab allies.12 This scenario could develop in a variety of troubling
ways. On the basis of publicly available information, Tehran appears to
be making the most progress toward a nuclear weapon via the uranium
route (in this case using gas centrifuges) rather than the plutonium
route. Nuclear weapons using uranium in the physics package for their
warheads do not always require testing to assure that they are functional.13 Consequently, Iran could become an undeclared nuclear weapons
power at some point and take advantage of a policy of nuclear weapons
“opacity.” Tehran’s progress in obtaining a nuclear weapons option is not
inevitable, but even crippling economic sanctions combined with covert
action (such as cyberattacks) cannot guarantee the end of the program. A
US or Israeli air campaign against Iran’s hardened and dispersed targets
could guarantee severe damage, but such attacks might only delay the
Iranian program, and also risk asymmetric escalation and the unraveling of current sanctions.14 Moreover, Tehran’s regional behavior could
become more aggressive even if it only develops an undeclared bomb or
a near-nuclear capability.
Complicating matters further, the Gulf states have also experienced
a decline in political relations with Tehran along with the rise of the
Iranian strategic threat. The near cold war between Iran and some Gulf
states became especially intense following the March 2011 Saudi-led Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) military intervention into Bahrain and the
outbreak of the Syrian civil war, which also began in the same month.15
Prior to the GCC move into Bahrain, the Iranians strongly supported
the demands of Bahrain’s mostly Shi’ite demonstrators, who demanded a
greater public role in the governance of the Sunni-led monarchy. Tehran
was subsequently infuriated by the Bahrain intervention which propped
up an anti-Iranian monarchy just as it was being challenged by at least
10     Anthony H. Cordesman, Securing the Gulf: Key Threats and Options for Enhanced Cooperation
(Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 19, 2013), iii, 1-3.
11     Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes, 123.
12     Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2012), 16, 172, 211.
13     The uranium-based Hiroshima bomb (“Little Boy”) was never tested before its use,
although the plutonium-based implosion design for the Nagasaki bomb (“Fat Man”) was tested on
the Trinity site on July 16, 1945. See General Leslie M. Groves, Now it Can be Told: The Story of the
Manhattan Project (New York: Da Capo Press, 1962), 288-304.
14     Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 229-230.
15     The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates.
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some pro-Iranian Shi’ite Bahrainis among the protestors. Although the
GCC intervention forces never actually fought with the demonstrators,
their presence was highly significant in bolstering Bahrain’s government.
Additionally, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in the same month as
the intervention in Bahrain further intensified Gulf Arab-Iranian tensions. At this time, Iran helped prop up the Assad regime, while most
Gulf states strongly backed anti-government rebels. Adding to this deterioration of relations, older antagonisms were further inflamed when
senior Iranian officials visited the disputed islands of Abu Musa and the
Tunbs as a way of underscoring their physical control over them.16 The
islands are also claimed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Gulf nations are concerned about Iran’s conventional forces, which
are large but have shortcomings. In this regard, a great deal of Iranian
military equipment is aging and severely worn by overuse. While the
Iranian military should be able to function effectively as a defensive
force, these units would have serious problems projecting offensive
power.17 The ability to project conventional military power across the
Gulf is also limited by Iran’s need to circumvent or neutralize United
States, British, French, and Gulf Arab naval forces stationed there. Iran’s
ability to provide effective logistical support to its forces in hostile territory is especially doubtful even with countries which can be reached
without crossing the Gulf (such as Iraq or Kuwait through Iraq). Iran
has been under a highly effective United Nations (UN) arms embargo
since 2010 and thereby been blocked from receiving conventional
weapons from its most important former suppliers including Russia and
China.18 Consequently, Tehran has been forced to rely on its domestic
arms industry, which is incapable of compensating for Tehran’s inability
to import modern weapons. These shortcomings have limited Iran’s
ability to project conventional military power.
Nonetheless, Tehran maintains a strong capacity for asymmetric
warfare with its naval and ground forces. Facets of this approach related
to landpower include the use of irregular forces; the use of proxy forces
as well as covert arms transfers; and providing training to such groups
within a target country. One of Iran’s most useful tools in projecting
this kind of power is the al Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC). The al Quds Force has a long record of working
with Shi’ite and other revolutionary groups in a variety of countries
including Iraq and Afghanistan.19 In both of these instances, they also
supplied highly effective Improvised Exploding Devices (IEDs) to antiAmerican forces.20
While Iran is the most important national security concern for Gulf
Arab allies, it is not their only concern. Many Gulf states also view the
future of Iraq as uncertain with considerable potential for developments
to harm their security. Some Gulf leaders, especially Saudis and Kuwaitis,
16     “Iran Willing to Talk to UAE on Islands Row,” The Peninsula, May 8, 2013; “UAE denounces
Iran lawmakers’ visit to islands,” Khaleej Times, May 7, 2013.
17     Cordesman, Securing the Gulf, 15
18     “UN Arms Embargo on Iran,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://
www.SIPRI.org, October 11, 2012.
19     Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities:
The Threat to the Northern Gulf (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 78-81.
20     “U.S. Blames Iran for New Bombs in Iraq,” USA Today, January 31, 2007; “IED Attacks Up
in Afghanistan, Down in Iraq,” Army Times, November 15, 2007.
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are deeply suspicious of most leading Shi’ite Iraqi politicians including
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, whom many view as an authoritarian
leader seeking to marginalize Iraq’s Sunni Arabs politically. In addition,
Kuwaitis do not feel that all of their problems with Iraq started and
stopped with Saddam Hussein. While Saddam was their greatest enemy,
he was not the only Iraqi head of state to claim Kuwait was part of Iraq.
King Ghazi (reign 1933-39) and Prime Minister Qasim (in office 195863) made similar claims, although one was a monarchist and the other
an Arab Nationalist revolutionary. Unsurprisingly, many Kuwaitis are
uncertain that Iraqis have truly renounced previous beliefs that Kuwait
is part of Iraq.21
Paradoxically, many Gulf Arabs who are concerned about a strong,
overbearing, nationalist Iraq are also worried about an unstable Iraq
sliding into sectarian chaos. Gulf Arabs, who are mostly Sunni, often
blame the Shi’ite-led Iraqi government for the increase in Iraqi sectarianism, but many are also concerned about the continued rise of
al Qaeda-related Sunni groups now that Iraq’s Sunni-Shi’ite relations
have become polarized. The July 2013 attacks on two Iraqi maximum
security prisons by the al-Qaeda affiliate, “The Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant” suggests a tough, competent enemy. In this professional
and well-coordinated operation, over 100 guards were killed and 500
prisoners were freed.22 The danger of simultaneous al Qaeda progress in
controlling territory within both Iraq and Syria only adds to the nightmare for Gulf nations that fear widening instability.

Basing and Military Exercises

In addressing current threats, Gulf states must balance domestic
public opinion with defense needs. Many Arab states have endured long
and problematic histories with Western military bases on their territory,
and this background influences current Gulf Arab decisionmaking on
how to organize military cooperation with the United States. Until at
least the 1950s, great powers often maintained that their bases were
designed to defend regional nations against foreign invaders, although
the presence of such facilities was sometimes used to pressure and influence local client governments. In response to these concerns, as well
as changing Western military requirements and economic pressures,
the U.S. military presence in the Middle East steadily declined, and a
number of major Western bases were evacuated in response to nationalist demands. By the early 1970s, Western military presence in the area
had been dramatically scaled down. Western combat forces currently
retain an ongoing presence at military facilities only in some smaller
Gulf Arab states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). The US Army also stationed significant forces in Saudi
Arabia during and after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in
1990-91, but these forces were withdrawn in 2003.
In general, the Gulf Arab countries do not favor large numbers of
ground forces permanently stationed on their territory, and they have
21     Ahmad al-Khaled, “Maliki Digs Up the Hatchet,” Kuwait Times, July 7, 2006; W. Andrew
Terrill, Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 41-49.
22     Jabbar Yaseen and Liz Sly, “Iraq Jailbreak Highlights al-Qaeda Affiliate’s Ascendancy,” The
Washington Post, July 22, 2013.
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shown a preference for air or naval bases. Western facilities in Bahrain
support the US Fifth Fleet, while Qatar and the UAE allow the United
States Air Force to utilize key air bases, although only a limited number
of US aircraft regularly use these facilities.23 Most of the US combat
aircraft currently used to protect the Gulf are naval aircraft stationed on
aircraft carriers, although the US Air Force presence in the region can
be expanded in emergency situations. Conversely, Kuwait has a much
more extensive history with hosting both US ground and air forces,
with many US troops stationed at Camp Arifjan, south of Kuwait city.
Currently, Camp Arifjan is an important transit point for equipment
being returned to the United States from Afghanistan.24 At this time,
around 13,500 US troops are stationed in Kuwait, down from 25,000
during the last stages of the US military presence in Iraq.25
Yet, if some Gulf Arab countries display reticence about large
numbers of foreign ground troops stationed permanently on their soil,
this does not mean they fail to recognize the importance of landpower
or they only seek cooperation with US air and naval forces. A number
of Arab Gulf states are concerned that negative experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan will cause the United States to lose interest in the Middle
East, especially as America becomes more energy self-sufficient.26
The decision to reduce US Army forces in Europe from four to two
brigade combat teams and supporting units also complicated US power
projection into the Middle East.27 Within the Gulf region, many Arab
countries are extremely interested in working with the US Army to help
them continue professionalizing their armed forces and raising their
standards for conventional defense, joint operations, ground intelligence
operations, counterinsurgency, and other capabilities.28 US commitment
to support these activities through both training and exercises is deeply
reassuring to Gulf Arab states.
In this environment, many Gulf political and military leaders, as
well as other Arabs, have found US-led bilateral or multinational military
exercises to be an exceptionally valuable tool for their security. Exercises,
unlike basing rights, do not involve a long-term military presence that
can grate on domestic public opinion and provide the appearance of
excessive US influence. Rather, military exercises can more easily be
portrayed as a collaboration, in which the United States is showing its
support for local militaries by working with them. Another advantage
is that during times of domestic Arab political tension, exercises can
be rescheduled in accordance with the wishes of the host government.
Conversely, at times of regional tension, regularly scheduled exercises
can be expanded and the number of US troops participating in the exercise can be increased to show support for the host government. Such
expansions are generally seen in the region as a show of force, although
their linkage to previously planned exercises allows the United States
23     Michael O’Hanlon and Bruce Riedel, “Land Warriors,” Foreign Affairs.com, July 2, 2013.
24     “US Reducing Military Presence in Kuwait,” Kuwait Times, December 20, 2012.
25     Kenneth Katzman, Kuwait: Security, Reform and U.S. Policy (Washington DC: Congressional
Research Service, 2013), 16; Donna Casseta, “US Plans Significant Military Presence in Kuwait,”
Associated Press, July 19, 2012.
26     See “US Looks to Allies to Secure Arabian Gulf,” The National (UAE), April 24, 2013.
27     Michelle Tan, “Bradley Fighting Vehicles Set to Leave Europe by Next Year,” Army Times,
August 3, 2013.
28     Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 178-179. Cordesman, Securing the Gulf, 41-46.
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and its allies to deny they are being provocative. Exercise Eager Lion,
which is based in Jordan, and involves the United States and a number
of Gulf Arab allies is an example of this approach.29
Eager Lion has an especially robust landpower component, and many
observers felt the enhanced 2013 exercise could have sent a message of
solidarity with Jordan to the Syrian government, which believed Amman
was too sympathetic to some rebel forces in the Syrian civil war. The
message might have been reinforced by the US decision to leave a Patriot
missile battery and a limited number of F-16 fighter aircraft behind for
use in future exercises.30 About 700 US Army and Air Force personnel
remained in Jordan to support these systems following Eager Lion 2013,
along with approximately 100 already there as a forward headquarters
of the 1st Armored Division.31 Although Jordan is not a Gulf state, it is
an Arab monarchy which works closely with both the Gulf Arabs and
the United States on regional security matters. Gulf participation in a
large multinational Eager Lion exercise may send an important message
of US-Gulf solidarity. The Gulf states are also involved in numerous
smaller bilateral exercises with the United States within their own territory as well as the GCC’s Peninsula Shield exercises.32
It is vital for Eager Lion to retain its strong landpower component
and for the Gulf states to expand their participation in these exercises
due to the uncertain status of future Egyptian-based Bright Star exercises.33 In many Arab states, including those within the Gulf, the army
is the dominant service; in all Arab countries it is an important military
service. In only a few wealthy Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, has
the air force been more favored historically (primarily because air force
requires fewer human resources and armies can more effectively conduct
anti-government coups). Consequently, military-to-military contacts and
relationships are most often going to be built with Gulf army officers
and to some extent with air force officers. All Gulf states have small
navies that function primarily as coastal defense forces. US Navy joint
exercises with Arab navies are important and must be continued, but
they will probably never involve the level of US-Arab coordination and
cooperation as exercises involving landpower.34
Another reason for a vigorous US-Gulf exercise program with a
strong landpower component is Iranian actions. The Iranians frequently
engage in large-scale joint exercises, which they use for both training
and propaganda purposes. The land component of these exercises is
usually defensive, focusing on responding to a US-led invasion of the
Iranian homeland, which is, of course, unlikely to occur. The Iranians
29     GCC participants in Eager Lion exercises have included Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. See Combined Joint Task Force Spartan Public Affairs, “Eager
Lion Commanders Hold Press Conference,” US Central Command Press Release, May 15, 2012.
30     Michael R. Gordon and Thom Shanker, “U.S. to Keep Warplanes in Jordan, Pressing Syria,”
The New York Times, June 16, 2013.
31     Donna Miles, “Advance Headquarters Elements Operating in Jordan,” United States Department
of Defense Press Release, April 18, 2013, http://www.defense.gov.
32     Cordesman, Securing the Gulf, 2.
33     Bright Star has been repeatedly delayed or cancelled as a result of the political turmoil in
Egypt, but planning for the exercise continues. See Phil Steward, “U.S. to Go Ahead with Joint
Military Exercise in Egypt,” Reuters, July 31, 2013.
34     When the author visited Iraq in 2008, he was somewhat amused by Iraqi officers who
continually addressed US Navy captains serving as staff officers as “colonel” despite ongoing
efforts to correct them.
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usually proclaim these exercises to be resounding successes and routinely exaggerate the number of forces involved, but the exercises remain
meaningful as political theater.35

Regionally Aligned Forces

In addition to military exercises, one of the most effective ways
of improving US military coordination with its Gulf allies is through
regionally aligned forces. Regionally aligned forces are a Department
of the Army initiative based on the lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars. The initiative is still in its early phases and may be subject to considerable modification on a trial-and-error process as it is implemented.
The concept involves US Army maneuver combat units and support
forces focused on a specific Geographical Combatant Command as
part of their normal training program.36 This concept was initially
tested with a program to prepare the first such brigade for service with
Africa Command (AFRICOM), where it was successful enough to be
considered a model for the Army component of the other Geographic
Combatant Commands.
Units assigned to regionally aligned forces are expected to receive
cultural training and language familiarization for areas where they might
be expected to operate. By working more closely with regional militaries
on a recurring basis, US personnel will more quickly interface with their
counterparts during an escalating crisis. Cooperation with local forces
has also been strongly enhanced by the presence of numerous officers
from allied nations who have received training and military education
in the United States. It is also useful that English is widely spoken by
officers in most Gulf militaries as well as some other militaries within
the larger Middle East.
The 1st Armored Division, based in Fort Bliss, Texas, has been
aligned with US Central Command and has played an important role in
the Eager Lion exercises previously discussed. During Eager Lion 2013,
the 1st Armored Division provided the bulk of the US Army ground forces
assigned to the exercise. As part of the alignment with CENTCOM,
1st Armored Division assisted the Jordanians with integrated missile
defense, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.37 A strong working
relationship with Jordan is particularly useful since forces operating out
of Jordan can move into the Gulf area quickly if they are needed. The
presence of such forces at times of crisis in the Gulf could be a restraining
influence on potential aggressors. Adding to these advantages, the King
Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC), about
20 kilometers northeast of Amman, has also proven to be an excellent
command and control site for combined US-Jordanian operations.38

35     Crist, The Twilight War, 569-570.
36     General Raymond Odierno, “Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building
Partnerships,” Army Live, The Official Blog of the U.S. Army, March 22, 2012.
37     C. Todd Lopez, “1st Armored Division Troops Aligned With CENTCOM Ready for Eager
Lion Kick-Off,” http://www.army.mil, Official Homepage of the United States Army, http://www.army.
mil, June 3, 2013.
38     See “King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center”, http:// www.kasotc.com.

US Landpower in Regional Focus

Terrill

73

Sharing the Lessons of Counterinsurgency

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have reinforced the lesson that
counterinsurgencies can take years if not decades to resolve. These
operations require time, public patience, and significant numbers of
troops trained in counterinsurgency tactics. Ideally, these troops should
be provided by the government being threatened rather than an outside
power. Air and naval forces also play important supporting roles in
counterinsurgencies, but ground forces almost always have to take the
lead. Armed drones have played an important role in countries such as
Yemen, but strike weapons can only address certain aspects of the insurgent problem. They can kill insurgents but cannot reassert government
authority in contested areas. Therefore, it is important for US Army
forces continue to provide practical advice and assistance to friendly
nations, while maintaining as light a footprint as possible.39
Insurgencies currently exist in a number of Middle Eastern countries
including US allies such as Iraq and Yemen. While the GCC states view
both of these insurgencies as dangerous, they are especially concerned
about the future of Yemen.40 In Yemen, the insurgent group al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was able to occupy and administer
significant tracts of three major provinces including most of Abyan province until a Yemeni government offensive, heavily funded by the GCC,
liberated the territory in May-June 2012.41 Although AQAP was defeated
and lost overt control of the contested territory, it remains a strong terrorist and insurgent force and has not relinquished the idea of creating
an al Qaeda emirate in southern Yemen, which could become a threat to
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.42 In the long term, this insurgency
can, in all likelihood, be eradicated only by a reformed Yemeni army that
fights effectively and avoids large-scale corruption. Moreover, Yemeni
troops that are inadequately trained for counterinsurgency can take
significant casualties and make serious mistakes that harm the struggle
against AQAP. Currently, US Army trainers are working with Yemen’s
military to advance their level of professionalization.43 Fortunately for
them, at least some Yemeni senior officers are also deeply committed to
improving the quality of the force.44
Iraq faces some of the same problems as Yemen. The al Qaeda
affiliate in Iraq, the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” is directing
acts of terrorism against government facilities and institutions as well
as Shi’ite citizens in partial response to Sunni grievances but also to
39     For an excellent discussion of how US troops became increasingly effective at counterinsurgency operations over time in Iraq see James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War:
Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford
Security Studies, 2011).
40     The GCC has taken the lead in providing support and financial help for Yemen’s transition
to a more stable government including brokering the departure from power of longtime strongman President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
41     “Al Qaeda in Yemen on the Run as Military Regains Control over 2 of Its Strongholds,”
The Washington Post, June 12, 2012.
42     “Yemen Army Retakes al Qaeda Bastions,” Jordan Times, June 12, 2012.
43     Casey L. Coombs, “Yemen to Get UAVs From the U.S” .Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
September 26, 2012; Anthony H. Cordesman, Robert M. Shelala II, and Omar Mohamed, U.S.
and Iranian Strategic Competition: Yemen and U.S. Security (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, August 8, 2013), 10-15.
44     The author has been consistently impressed by the seriousness, commitment, and integrity
of Yemeni officers he has met at the US Army War College and elsewhere.
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advance the al Qaeda agenda. The US leadership will, therefore, have
to make decisions on how to help the Iraqi government with advice and
military equipment while pushing it to be more inclusive.45 A key to any
successful counterinsurgency is to place distance between the insurgents
and the population where they operate. The Iraqi government cannot do
this if it only serves the interest of its Shi’ite citizens. US Army training
and other support must be closely linked to political reform, but military
aid is vital once the Iraqi government begins a serious effort at reform
and Sunni inclusion.
In imparting the lessons of counterinsurgency, the US Army will
also need to work with Gulf Arab air forces as well as armies because
many of the former own their nation’s military helicopters. Only a few
Arab armies possess attack helicopters like the United States Army. The
most important exception in the Gulf region is the Royal Saudi Land
Forces (RSLF) which has an army aviation branch which contains helicopters.46 Regardless of service affiliation, all Arab rotary-wing forces
can benefit from interface with US Army units. The United States Army
made extensive use of helicopters during the counterinsurgency wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan and have internalized a variety of useful lessons
that can be passed along to friendly states.

Air and Missile Defense

Surface-to-surface missiles (such as Scuds) have been used extensively in some Middle Eastern wars, though never with unconventional
(chemical, biological, or nuclear) warheads. In the Gulf area, conflicts
involving surface-to-surface missiles include attacks made by both sides
during the Iran-Iraq war and missile strikes against Saudi targets during
Operation Desert Storm.47 Saddam Hussein also reached outside of the
Gulf area and fired 39 extended-range Scud missiles at Israel during the
1991 conflict. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Scud missiles were used
by secessionist forces in Yemen during the 1994 civil war, and there
have been some reports of Syrian government forces occasionally firing
Scuds at rebel forces in the current civil war in that country.48
Friendly Gulf military forces are extremely interested in systems
to defend their airspace against air and missile strikes for a number of
reasons including the significant resources that Iran has applied to its
ballistic missile program and the fear that Iranian missiles will eventually be armed with unconventional warheads.49 In any scenario where
Iranian missiles are fired at a Gulf state, one might reasonably expect
that US and Gulf air forces will seek to destroy as many of these systems
45     “Iraqi Official: Baghdad would welcome U.S. military help as Pentagon Considers Sending
Trainers,” Washington Post, June 27, 2013.
46     Tim Ripley, Middle East Airpower in the 21st Century (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword,
2010), 173, 188.
47      Thomas L. McNaugher, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the
Iran-Iraq War,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 5-34; W Andrew Terrill, “The Gulf War
and Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” Comparative Strategy (April-June 1992): 163-176.
48     Max Fisher, “What Syria’s Scud Missile Launches Tell Us About the Regime’s Thinking,”
The Washington Post, December 12, 2012.; Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, “Syrian Government
Blamed for Ballistic Missile Attack,” The New York Times, July 28, 2013.
49     Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Issues for U.S. Policy (Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2013), 11-12. Suzanne Maloney, “Thinking the
Unthinkable: The Gulf States and the Prospect of a Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Memo of the Saban
Center at Brookings, January 27, 2013, 11.
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on the ground as possible. Such actions are indispensable, but there are
continuing questions about how long this will take. The last US war
against an enemy which was well-armed with missiles occurred in 1991
in Iraq. At that time, Saddam Hussein’s forces were able to fire a number
of Scuds and modified Scuds at coalition military forces and at Israel
despite a substantial air campaign to destroy these assets.
While US capabilities for hunting missiles have undoubtedly
improved since 1991, Iran has a larger and more diverse weapons arsenal
than Iraq did. It is also a much larger country than Iraq. Many of Iran’s
longer-range missiles can be located in remote parts of the country and
still strike the Gulf Arab countries. The Gulf Arab states, therefore,
have an ongoing interest in a strong, layered defense for protecting
their territory including land and sea-based systems. The most important components of this layered defense are the Patriot air and missile
defense system and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system
(THAAD).50 Many partner countries within the region already have
Patriot systems, and are now acquiring PAC-3 anti-missile capabilities
for those systems.51 With so much at stake, they are tremendously interested in working with the United States on missile defense.52

Conclusions

US landpower will remain profoundly relevant to defending the Gulf
and deterring recklessness by regional powers. Landpower can be especially valuable by asserting a US presence and helping local partners. While
US national leadership can be expected to avoid large conventional wars,
it will also be required to safeguard other vital national interests. These
interests will need to be protected in creative and flexible ways that include
landpower to underscore US commitment to deterrence and defense.
A useful approach to the application of landpower in the post-Iraq
era has also been evolving in a way that reflects the lessons of that conflict.
Rather than rotating significant military forces into bases throughout the
region and thus establishing a permanent ground presence, the US Army
leadership has chosen to emphasize a vigorous military exercise program
and extensive collaboration with partner nations through regionally
aligned forces. Organizing the timing, scope, and mix of forces for these
exercises can be calibrated to meet regional threats while showing appropriate respect for the equality and sovereignty of US partners in the region.
It is also possible, if not likely, that US regional partners will need greater
reassurance if unfavorable political developments occur in Iran, Iraq,
or elsewhere in the region. The development of an Iranian near-nuclear
capability would be an especially serious threat requiring US reassurance
of Gulf allies, beyond the stationing of air and naval forces.
The future of regionally aligned forces will be determined by senior
US military leaders, but it currently looks very promising. In the face of
growing threats, many partner nations are almost certain to welcome
US support in providing regionally aligned forces to help improve their
50     Tom Vanden Brook, “Oil-Rich Emirates: A Key Part of Defense Against Iran,” USA Today,
April 25, 2013.
51     Cordesman, Securing the Gulf, 56.
52     Aaron Mehta, “Qatar, UAE Request THAAD Purchases,” Defense News, November 5, 2012;
Jim Wolf, “U.S. in 3.5 Billion Arms Sale to UAE and Iran Tension,” Reuters, December 31, 2011.
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military performance in such skills as air and missile defense, chemical
and biological protection, counterinsurgency operations, intelligence,
and other important aspects of modern warfare. Nevertheless, there
are some issues of concern that bear watching. In particular, regionally
aligned forces working with Middle Eastern and Gulf militaries will
need to be properly supported with personnel, material resources, and
funding for the ongoing training with counterpart militaries. If these
units receive less than units aligned to the Pacific, this will be noticed by
both Gulf allies and potential adversaries. The US government emphasis
on the Pacific is important but cannot be allowed to seriously weaken
other commands.
In sum, the long, difficult, and expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
have soured many American opinion leaders and large elements of the
public on the idea of ever again using US ground forces for large-scale
warfare in the Middle East. The sacrifices of the Iraq war, in particular, can also be contrasted with many of the early projections that the
conflict would be quick and easy and not require a long occupation to
prevent post-war chaos. Yet, to respond to the legacy of these conflicts
by minimizing the potential contribution of ground troops in defense of
the Gulf states risks a possible failure to deter precisely the type of war
that both policymakers and public would largely like to avoid.

